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Temporal consciousness seems so common that if we want to understand what philosophers find 
puzzling about it we must first look into the ways in which we would naively account for it. My initial 
worry will thus be that of making clear how puzzlement regarding temporal experience arises in the 
first place. In the first section, I will focus on a certain family of solutions, sometimes referred to as 
Specious Present theories, and analyse two main subsets of this family: extentionalism and 
retentionalism. In section two I will detect the point of contact between these views and formalise it in 
terms of the individuation argument, following Hoerl’s proposal. Then, I will advance some objections 
against this argument, leaving thus space, in the last section, to weigh up the validity of the solutions 
we met. This should allow us to better understand the conceptual knot that originated the puzzle, and 
contribute to individuate the space for a possible novel position. The aim of this work is to give a clear 
picture of the main solutions to the paradox of temporal consciousness and some of their deficiency, so 
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Imagine you are driving home; in your visual field a succession of “now” continuously follows one 
after another in what appears to be a continuous stream of consciousness; each scene merges into the 
next and constitutes a homogeneous flow. In front of you, you seem to see the traffic light changing 
from red to green and your hands standing still on the steering wheel. Change – as well as duration – is 
what happens from one instant to the other; in this sense, it seems that both change and duration are 
predicated of groups of ‘presents’, and that, somehow, they hold them together in a unitary awareness. 
But how can a single act of awareness, if it captures only one instant at a time, contain more than a 
single event? It seems as though our temporal experience is caught in between the instantaneity of our 
present, of which we are directly aware, and the extended form of temporal events. In other words, we 
may ask: how is it possible that we can experience temporal duration if we are solely aware of static 
snapshots that lack temporal extension? In what follows, I will propose to analyse this puzzle in terms 
of three apparently true propositions that jointly constitute an inconsistent triad.  
 
Phenomeno-temporal realism: we can be directly aware of temporal duration. 
 
This proposition’s aim is to do justice to the idea that we seem to experience change, duration and 
succession directly. Hence, the adverb ‘directly’ plays an important role here, in that it specifies that 
temporal properties, such as duration, succession, change or movement, are not inferred, remembered 
or imagined, but perceived. 
 
Momentariness thesis: we are directly aware only of the present moment. 
 
The second proposition captures two characteristics of our experience: that we are directly aware only 
of the present, and that the present is momentary. As for the first, it is important to notice that the word 
‘present’ (here and throughout this work) refers to the phenomenal time at which events are experienced 
rather than the objective time at which they occur. The second claim regards the extension of such 
present, and it complies with the idea that we conceive the present of our awareness as lacking any 
significant temporal extension.  
 




This proposition seeks to capture the apparent incommensurability between the awareness of the 
temporal extension of events and that of the present. Proposition (3) holds that there is no viable 
solution: if the present is momentary, then – by definition – our awareness of it cannot include any 
property that extends over time. 
In light of these preliminary considerations, then, we may note that the intuitive certainty of temporal 
experience is not, at least prima facie, a good reason to believe that such experience is not problematic. 
Once the problem of temporal consciousness and its constitutive elements is identified, our next concern 
will be to explore its solutions and locate them in the space determined by these propositions. In the 
following section I will map two Specious Present theories, giving reasons in their support and pointing 
to some of the difficulties they may raise.  
 
 
1. The Specious Present theories 
Extensionalism 
How is it possible that we perceive temporal passage, given that our awareness is confined to temporally 
unextended acts, and what is true for the experience as a whole is true for its constitutive parts? An 
intuitive way to answer this worry is to deny the momentariness thesis. In the first part of this section, 
I will present a general outline of the position occupied by those who follow this intuition, which is 
commonly addressed to as extensionalism.  
Extensionalism takes a stance on the refusal of the second proposition: it holds that our stream of 
consciousness results from the composition of temporally extended chunks of experience that 
incorporate the temporal properties of the phenomena. Thus, the present experience needs to be thought 
of as temporally extended, with such extension stretching extending through clock time and including 
a multiplicity of events. What is called present, in this sense, is not the fraction of time identified by the 
word “now”, but an enlarged interval within which events share a common phenomenal presence. 
Elements that fall within such extended ‘present’ appear clear and distinct in one’s mind, and they are 
all ‘present to one’ with the same vividness. 
The present experience corresponds to one of these chunks, which in turn corresponds to what we are 
directly aware of. In conscious experience, then, we are directly aware only of those events that fall 
within such extended acts, and we experience them unitarily. Experience of succession (as well as of 
movement, change, duration or any other temporal property of events) obtains in virtue of the elements 
of that succession being close enough to fall within a same act of awareness. This principle, at the heart 
of the extensionalist’s proposal, is the Diachronic Unity thesis. DUT affirms that events spread through 
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positive time intervals can be experienced as united as long as they are also apprehended by means of 
extended acts of awareness. In other words, this means that one can be directly aware of a multitude of 
events occupying positive time intervals. 
Among the possible objections to extensionalism, one in particular plays an important role in our 
enquiry. Indeed, it may be thought that the mere fact that events – granted they fall within an extended 
present – are experienced together seems insufficient to experience a succession. According to 
extensionalism, though, a mere succession of events is experienced as a succession not only when events 
are experience together, but also because their temporal properties are inherited by our experience. 
According to Phillips (2014, 144), we can see this by considering a simple case: “[n]ext time you see 
the traffic lights change from amber to red, stop and consider: which experience came first, your 
experience of the red light, or your experience of the amber light?”. Insofar as it makes sense to ask this 
question, it seems reasonable to claim that temporal properties of events – unlike other properties (like 
colours, shapes, or spatial properties) – can also be shared by our experience. The ‘specious present’ 
names the fundamental unit within which inheritance takes place, and such a unit is conceived as 
conceptually prior to its subparts.  
I believe there is a sense in which the answer offered by the extensionalist underestimates the worry 
expressed in the objection. To better understand this, let us turn to our experience again. Imagine you 
are walking down a familiar street. The repetitive ‘clangs’ produced by a construction worker’s hammer 
constitutes the background of you stream of thoughts; suddenly, a bird’s chirping makes its way into 
your auditory experience. You hear both sounds, and yet your attention is not specifically directed to 
either of them. Clangs and chirps enter your ear in rapid succession and you hear sounds that constitute 
a succession. The distance between the sounds is such that they fit in the extended present. However, 
my claim is that the succession of sounds that is present in your auditory field does not result in an 
experience of succession. In fact, you hear a succession of sounds: the succession you hear, though, is 
not yet heard as a succession – or so it may seem. 
This objection draws an important distinction within our experience. Think of a spatial analogy: while 
you are reading these words, your visual field includes much more than what you are currently focusing 
your attention on; and although it is not seen with the same vividness, your visual background is 
nonetheless seen1. A similar observation can be made with temporal phenomena. Think of your 
experience of the sound of a clock while you are working in your office. This sound is present to your 
experience, but not always in the same way. When you concentrate on it, the succession of ‘ticks’ and 
‘tocks’ become preponderant and it seems as though you cannot avoid hearing them. But as your 
attention goes to your book, those same sounds, that one moment ago were experienced as a succession, 
                                                          
1 I will return on this point more in detail in the last chapter. For now, I am only interested in the phenomenal 
relevance of this consideration with reference to extensionalism. 
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slowly fade away. Although they still combine to form a succession that is experienced, they are not 
yet experienced as such. Something similar occurs, for instance, when you hear someone utter the word 
‘sentences’. In the brief time spanned by the word (less than a second), a succession of three ‘es’ enter 
your ear, but even if the es are successive, you may still not experience them as a succession. In another 
context (say, when someone reads a poem) when you hear the word uttered again you may direct your 
attention to the sounds of the letter ‘e’. In this case, the space that divides the es appears to be neglected, 
and they are not just a mere succession of experiences, but they combine in your experience to form a 
clear and distinct succession.  
These examples aim to show that our attention seems to play an important role in our experience, 
drawing distinctions, within the observable and unobservable, between things that are noticed or 
unnoticed. We may fail to notice the presence in time of something that stands right in front of our eyes, 
whose duration, although experienced, is not yet experienced as such. In other words, the simple fact 
that something is present to our experience does not suggest that it is thus noticed. For this reason, then, 
one may doubt whether the mere fact that a succession of sounds is inherited by our experience, even 
if these sounds are close enough to be experienced together, does in itself suffice to claim that we have 
an experience of succession. 
Although the extensionalist’s answer is licit, then, we may wonder whether it is satisfactory. Even 
granted the validity of the extensionalist’s proposal, still, it seems it does not fully grasp the peculiarity 
of our temporal experience since, as we observed, temporal consciousness may fail to obtain even 
though a succession of sounds is close enough to be experienced together, and their properties are 
inherited by our experience. If this is the case, and we agree with the interpretation of the examples 
offered, it seems that the extensionalist owes us a clarification regarding how the succession 
incorporated in our experience is also experienced as such. 
 
Retentionalism  
An answer to this problem is offered by retentionalism. Indeed, (although it encompasses a number of 
different views) retentionalism is generally construed as claiming that consciousness of temporally 
extended intervals occurs by means of momentary acts of awareness. Whereas the extended 
consciousness, according to which experience mirrors the sequence of wordly states, suffice to have 
temporal consciousness in the extensionalist’s view, the retentionalist claims that it is the mode of our 
awareness that orders packets of events simultaneously apprehended to represent extended intervals.  
When we listen to a melody, for instance, at every instant past and future states are apprehended together 
with the present event, although in different ways. At the point of the eight-note scale when we hear fa 
(fig.1), our present experience includes the note we are currently hearing, mi that is just passed, re and 
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do progressively receding into a farther past, and a certain perceptive degree of expectations toward sol, 
la and si. However, none of these notes is experienced with the same mode of presentation. Fa is 
intended as present (it is the only note that is phenomenally present to us), while mi, re and sol are 
retained in the background, each at its own degree of pastness (in fig. 1, this is rendered with the 
modifier ’ ). Finally, we are aware of fa, sol and la in the form of expectations (*) – that is, we don’t 
hear them as present, but as approaching. At every instant, the present of our awareness combined with 
protentions towards the future and past retentions constitutes a perceptive horizon (in orange), where 
the latter progressively fades away while the former constantly receives confirmation or 
disconfirmation. If this is not verified, we do not have temporal experience.   
figure 1. Husserl’s time diagram  
 
 
Retentionalism denies the incommensurability thesis: awareness of duration does fit into the present 
moment. But how can a series of events fit into an instantaneous act? According to the retentionalist, 
the worry that inspires such doubt is rooted in a fundamentally extensionalist conception of temporal 
consciousness. For the extensionalist, who conceives temporal consciousness as the footprint of time 
on our experience, the idea of an extended stretch of time that fits into an unextended awareness, to the 
extent that it breaks the parallelism between experience and ordinary time, may at first sound 
problematic. But, according to the retentionalist, experience does not extend parallel to the arrow of 
time in the first place. Instead, experience is two dimensional; the continuous stream is cut by a parallel 










This perpendicular line hosts the events apprehended simultaneously, each of which is perceived in the 
modality described – just passed, imminent, yet to come…. 
But we may ask again – does this suffice to account for what is peculiar of our temporal experience? 
That is, is it always the case that if our experience has the characteristics just presented, we experience 
the temporal properties of events? I believe the answer to this question must be negative and, to this 
scope, I will introduce two examples in which it seems that temporal consciousness fails to obtain even 
if the retentionalist’s requirements on our experience are in place.  
 
 
figure 2. Dog in a bubble, Image from Twitter account WeRateDog 
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The above photograph shows a dog caught with perfect timing at the right distance from the camera 
and the bubble that floats between the camera and the dog, so that one is given the impression that the 
dog itself is floating in mid-air inside the bubble. We are however perceptively aware that dog and 
bubble are not one contained in the other; rather, we see the moment captured by the picture as a moment 
of a wider perceptive progress – a progress in which the dog is running in a certain direction, and the 
bubble is floating around before popping or being popped. When we see the picture, there is a certain 
perceptual expectation that, in the next frame, the dog will accomplish another bit of its run, and the 
bubble will float another inch in some direction, and also that the illusion will be broken. A similar 
perceptual character is also directed to the past: we see the position occupied by the dog and the bubble 
in that instant as following from the position they occupied the moment before. This dynamicity of 
image perception, or more precisely its tension toward the past and the future, is even more evident in 
Myron’s sculpture showed below.  
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figure 3. Myron, Discobolus, http://mcarte.altervista.org/il-discobolo-mirone-di-eleutere-455-a-c/ 
 
This sculpture seems to suggest a movement – yet to occur – that is not perceived, but represented. By 
observing the tension of his muscles and the shape of his silhouette, we have the perceptual expectation 
that the throw will occur right in the next moment, in the sense that we see that moment as the moment 
before the throw. We are given the impression that the instant captured belongs to the sequence of 
movements carried out by a discobolus, and that that instant occupies the moment right before the 
execution of the act. We seem to see (in the form of an intention that is directed to the future) the events 
that follow in the imminent future.   
This analogy may constitute a problem insofar as it helps us notice that retentionalism individuates the 
peculiar features of temporal experience at one moment. Although this may constitute a vantage of this 
view (in that it individuates a structure that applies also to other kinds of experiences), it is also 
problematic, because it only provides a notion of temporal consciousness at an instant, rather than over 
time. The retentionalist could argue that the latter can be derived from the former, and that an experience 
of succession can be described as an experience where the structure of protentions and retention is 
present, over time, in every phase of the succession.  However, although this may explain how an 
experience of succession differs from a succession of experiences, the retentionalist has failed to explain 
why such difference would mark a distinction between temporal and non-temporal experiences2. What 
seems to emerge from these considerations, then, is that, in attempting to define the specious present as 
a simultaneous awareness of a series of events apprehended in different modalities, the retentionalist as 
gone as far as to propose a description of an experience of succession that cannot be distinguished from 
a mere succession of image experiences. 
In conclusion, then, if we agree with the interpretation of the examples proposed, it seems that neither 
extensionalism or retentionalism offer an interpretation of temporal experience that is ultimately 
convincing. As for extensionalism, we noted that one may experience events that are close enough to 
be experienced together without thereby being aware of their properties, although they were inherited 
by our experience. Similarly, we argued against retentionalism that the proposed structure of the 
specious present is not unique to temporal experience.  
The aim of these reflections was to shed some doubts on the intuition that, for temporal consciousness 
to obtain, we ought to appeal to the individuation of extended discrete perceptual experiences where 
                                                          
2 It could be argued that perception of static objects is itself a kind of temporal experience, in that stativity is a 
form of temporal duration; thus the structure is shared by image perception precisely because image 
perception is a form of temporal experience. However, this objection mistakenly attributes the structure of 
protentions and retention to the image as a physical object rather than to the image qua image. And while the 




events are experience together. As we shall see more in detail in the next section, it is precisely thanks 
to this point of contact that we can individuate a premise that is shared by both views. This will allow 
us to propose a more comprehensive critical assessment of the positions we have met so far, and move 
forward with our survey.    
 
 
2. The individuation argument 
As noted in the last section, although their proposals conflict when it comes to defining in what sense 
we need to understand an act of experiencing as extended, both extensionalism and retentionalism seem 
to agree on a fundamental point – that our experience is made up of units of awareness within which 
events are perceived together. In virtue of this common ground, we can identify a neutral position 
between extensionalists and retentionalists, which I will refer to as Specious Present theory, according 
to which a necessary condition for temporal consciousness is simply that events are experienced 
together. Before proceeding to a critical assessment of this claim, I will first outline the reasons that 
commit the SP theorist to it, and state it more exhaustively. I will identify these reasons with those given 
by Hoerl (2013) in what he calls the Individuation Argument. This argument appeals to the phenomenal 
distinction between our experience of the movement of a watch hands, and draws a more general 
conclusion on the nature of our experience. More specifically, the advocated phenomenal difference 
concerns the fact that one seems to be able to see only the movement of the second-hand of the watch. 
In the hour-hand case, in effect, even though one may verify that its position has changed, it seems as 
though the occurrence of the change is not noticed. From these observations, Hoerl proceeds by asking 
two questions: how we can account for this difference, and why there is such difference. According to 
Hoerl, the answer to the first question is pretty straightforward: “it is difficult to see how we can account 
for the contrast other than in terms of the idea that, in the case of the second-hand, you can see the hand 
moving just by looking at it, whereas you cannot do so in the case of the hour-hand” (Hoerl, 2013, 380). 
However, this answer – although accounts for the phenomenal difference – does not explain why there 
is such a difference. Hoerl does not provide such reason explicitly, but maintains that, in order to 
account for this difference, it appears reasonable to individuate an ‘interval of perceptibility’ within 
which we can directly observe the temporal properties of phenomena. This span of time, he argues, 
needs to be limited, given that only events that are close enough can fall within it, as in the second-hand 
case. On the basis of such considerations, though, we can deduce the implicit assumptions that 
successive events can be experienced together, and that the salient difference between the two cases 
amounts to the temporal distance between two successive observable positions of the hand. If this is the 
case, the reason why we experience motion in the second-hand is because the distance between two 
adjacent observable positions is small enough; when the distance is too big, like in the case of the hour-
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hand, motion cannot be seen. This is what ultimately justifies his conclusion that “the period of time 
that individual perceptual experiences can span is limited, with the term ‘the specious present’ denoting 
the maximal interval that an individual experience can span” (Hoerl 2013, 388). 
Given the particular structure of the argument, in order to refute it we can appeal to two different 
strategies: either we reject that we can experience temporal properties – which would require us to 
provide phenomenal evidence against the one presented by the argument – or we question the cogency 
of the explanation. Although I will concentrate my attention on the latter, it is worth mentioning that 
many philosophers choose the former. Their view is usually referred to as the Cinematic theory3, in that 
its proponents conceive that our experience is made up of static snap-shots, and that it is constituted by 
them analogously to how the sequence of frames, succeeding in a rapid succession, gives the impression 
of movement. With respect to the triad, this position corresponds to the denial of phenomeno-temporal 
realism. Indeed, this position can be broadly rendered as resulting from this argument: if a single act of 
awareness is instantaneous, and if an instantaneous awareness cannot include awareness of time, it 
follows that we do not experience time directly; from their perspective, instead, it is the intervention of 
a mechanism other than perception (e.g. memory) that gives us the impression that we experience 
temporal properties such as duration, movement or change.  
As I said, though, let us now leave these considerations behind and concentrate on the inference to the 
conclusion. What we are questioning now, is how the proposed answer gives a satisfactory explanation 
of the phenomenology also in other cases. To this scope, I will introduce a new example in which the 
implications of this explanation seem to give an unfamiliar description of our experience.  
Imagine you hear a loud and clear ‘beep’ that lasts a few seconds. Twenty days later you hear the same 
sound, and again after ten days, and so on the interval between two occurrences of the sound decreasing 
by half after each occurrence. The sounds get progressively closer, until only hours and then minutes 
separates them. In the last minutes, the sounds succeed one after the other faster and faster until they 
fuse together in an extended ‘beep’. I believe this experience has prima facie some characters that 
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the specious present theory. In fact, we can agree that we 
would generally interpret such experience as phenomenologically uniform, in the sense that the change 
the succession goes through is quantitative rather than qualitative. In other words, this is to say that the 
experience we undergo, when we hear that these sounds succeed each other, only seems to increase in 
frequency throughout the duration of the experience. 
SP theorists, indeed, must account for such example as a case in which events initially apprehended in 
successive experiences, as time passes by, get close enough to each other to be experienced together, 
thus resulting in a genuine experience of succession. In this view, at one point in the succession (located 
                                                          
3 I follow here the label proposed by Dainton (2017). Variants of this theory have been defended most 
famously by Reid, Dennet, Le Poidevin. 
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in the very last part of the succession, few instants before its climax), a phenomenal change must occur 
that resembles the phenomenal difference we noted between our experience of a second-hand and an 
hour-hand. The reason why, prima facie, we may have overlooked this qualitative change, it could be 
argued, is that, unlike the case of the hands of the watch, here the passage is gradual. If we imagine, in 
what we may call the ‘accelerated hour-hand’ case, that the continuous movement of the hour-hand 
steadily increases its speed until it reaches the speed of the second-hand, then it appears reasonable to 
argue that we would probably fail to notice the occurrence of this change, even though at some point 
motion would make its way into our experience.  
Although appealing, the validity of this analogy lies on whether, in the present example, we actually 
experience that phenomenal change between the succession of experiences and the experience of 
succession. However, given that, at first glance, it is not so introspectively clear what interpretation may 
better describe the experience we have in this case, I believe it would be appropriate to see what features 
characterises such phenomenal change in the accelerated hand case, and to assess whether they are 
shared by the experience under analysis. SP theorists agree that in the accelerated hand case we become 
aware of the temporal property (namely, the succession) only after a certain point. The phenomenal 
change we experience, then, concerns the becoming visible of a property that was unobservable, and 
one typical feature of this is, first of all, that there is an interval of time after which one can truly say of 
that property that one sees it, while before that interval one could not. The fact that this interval of time, 
due to the gradualness of the process, cannot be clearly identified, may explain why we could fail to 
notice when the change has occurred, and also why sometimes we may also fail to notice that a change 
has occurred. But it does not explain why in the other example the conditions for one to notice a change 
(or to fail to do so) do not seem to apply in the first place. When staring at the accelerated hour-hand, 
once motion become visible, it seems it would be plausible for one to say: “now I finally see it moving!” 
since something that was unobserved became observed. But this seems not to be the case in our example 
– that is, it does not seem that, once the temporal distance between the occurrence of the events 
decreases, and only then, it would make sense for one to say: “now I finally hear the succession!”. 
Moreover, the fact that the acceleration of the hand is gradual does not mean that the change itself 
occurs gradually. Indeed, given that the temporal property of an object is considered as a property of 
which we are (or we are not) aware (that is, that does not admit of grades of awareness), there should 
be a more or less determined moment in which we can become aware of it. But, as it seems not to make 
sense to attribute a temporal property only to some part of the succession, it seems equally questionable 
whether it is possible to individuate any more or less determined time t at which we begin hearing a 
succession within the succession itself. 
Finally, in addition to these remarks, it can also be noted, more in general, that the plausibility of 
appealing to the temporal distance between two successive observable states to explain phenomenal 
differences like the one we observe between the hands of a watch, once this claim is used to justify the 
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individuation of a specious present, and is thus applied to a number of other cases, ceases to be 
convincing. In the example proposed, for instance, according to the SP theorist, the increasing intensity 
of the succession would begin to be heard only in the last second of the succession. As Prosser 
comments (Prosser, 2016, 133), then, “[c]onsider listening to two musical notes: one very short note 
that lasts, say, one quarter of a second, and one longer note that lasts, say, two seconds. Is there any 
phenomenological difference between these experiences apart from their durations? I have to say that I 
am not aware of any”.  
These observations, although they do not constitute an objection to the necessity of adopting this 
explication, by showing to what extent it seems to go against the intuitive description we would naively 
give of the kind of experience we undergo in ordinary cases, may eventually contribute to raise some 
doubts on whether the specious present is the most convincing way to account for these phenomenal 
differences. What convinced us of the necessity to individuate such episodes in the first place, though, 
was the example of the hands of the clock: its intuitiveness seemed to push us to accept that temporal 
consciousness must rely on the existence of (somehow) extended acts of awareness. If we abstract from 
the reasons that move a proponent of the individuation argument, though, we realise that the acceptance 
of its conclusion (that we need to individuate discrete episodes of experiencing) does not follow from 
the acceptance of its premises (that we perceive time, there is a phenomenal difference between our 
experience of the second-hand compared to that of the hour-hand of a clock). Following this intuition, 
then, in the next section I will try to get rid of the idea that temporal perception can occur only in 
correlation with an extended form of awareness. After doing so, I will first differentiate my proposal 
from Prosser’s Dynamic Snapshot theory, and then proceed to respond as exhaustively as possible to 
those problems that were easily dodged by the SP theorists but that may at first appear insurmountable 
without recourse to the concept of specious present. 
 
 
3. Temporal consciousness as a process 
In the first two sections, we focused our attention on the reasons that one may propose in favour of the 
idea of the individuation of an extended present as a solution to the paradox of temporal consciousness, 
and we advanced some considerations that may shed some doubts both on the sufficiency and the 
necessity of this theoretical move. In this section, I shall sketch a proposal whose aim is to bring together 
the phenomeno-temporal realist conviction that temporal properties can be experienced directly, and 
the denial of the existence of the specious present. Such proposal can be identified with the claim that 
our awareness of the temporal properties of an object is a process that unfolds over time. I will refer to 
this position as processualism. According to processualism, we can visualise what it means to 
experience the temporal properties of an event by means of an analogy with a process such as writing 
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an essay or running. Running consists in an ordinate succession of acts – raising your left leg in 
coordination with you right arm; pushing on your foot to perform a little jump, etc. No one of these acts 
does by itself correspond to the act of running, even though the act of running depends on the ordered 
fulfilment of each of them. Similarly, I will argue, the temporal properties of events make their way 
into our experience in a processual way. 
As noted in the last section, the individuation argument argues for the explicative necessity of the 
specious present to account for temporal consciousness and to dissolve the paradox mentioned at the 
outset. In refusing this argument, then, we expose ourselves again to such paradox, whose threat is now 
even more compelling: if we deny that that conscious acts of perception are temporally extended, how 
is it possible that we are aware of the temporal properties of phenomena?  
A possible way to meet this worry has been advanced by Prosser in Experiencing Time. In a section 
dedicated to Specious Present theories (2016,  119), he advances a proposal, to which he does not 
eventually subscribe, named ‘Dynamic Snapshot’ theory. According to its advocate, the problem of the 
individuation of extended individual perceptual experiences is that it wrongly assumes that temporal 
consciousness requires the awareness of different states of the event experienced at different times. To 
prove this point, he provides examples wherein experience of motion seems not to require more than 
the experience of a single (dynamic) state. Such is the case, for instance, when we look at the needle of 
a speedometer, or in motion after-effects. In the first case, given that velocity is a quantity in which 
space and time are included unitarily, and can be thus represented in a single vector, it is argued that, 
simply by observing the needle, one would be aware of the occurrence of movement at an instant. 
Similarly, in motion after-effects or in illusory motion cases (picture below), the impression of motion 
is conveyed even though the object does not seem to change its position over time.  
With respect to the triad, then, this view denies the incommensurability thesis. Differently from 
retentionalism, though, the core intuition behind Prosser’s proposal is that, in order to accommodate the 
positive time interval necessary for the detection of temporal events, rather than extending the act of 
awareness (in the way envisaged by the retentionalist’s account we provided) we may as well reduce 
the number of states one must be aware of in order to experience change, movement, succession and 






figure 4. Illusory motion case. Animal collective (2009), Merriweather Post Pavilion, album cover  
 
If we consider the triad once again, though, it may be possible to find another solution to this problem. 
First, we may notice that a common trait that associate both Prosser’s proposal and the SP theories is 
that they all subscribe to the phenomeno-temporal realist’s claim that we directly experience temporal 
properties of events. What is more interesting, though, is that they all interpret this claim in the same 
way – that is, they all interpret the word ‘direct’ to mean that temporal properties must be experienced 
at once, in that according to each of them it is in a single act of awareness that we become aware of 
these properties. However, this does not seem to be the only way we can interpret the word directly. 
Think for example of our object experience: to claim that an apple is experienced directly does not seem 
to imply that one must experience all its aspects – nor only some of them – at once. Likewise, we could 
argue that experiencing a succession directly does not itself suggests that we must be aware of all its 
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states (or some) at any one time. A view that opposes these proposals, then, is a view according to which 
awareness of time does not happen at any individual time, but results from the awareness of a succession 
of momentary acts of consciousness. Processualism can thus be understood as claiming that we can be 
directly aware of a succession one (momentary) act of awareness after the other. 
Think again about the running analogy. At each instant of you run, your do not run, in the sense that 
you do not move (given that you are within a temporal section so small that does not admit of temporal 
extension). But at the same time at each instant you are running, in the sense that you occupy one of 
the positions that, one after the other, constitute your run. The same ambivalence applies with respect 
to the realist’s claim: the fact that we directly perceive a succession does not necessarily mean that we 
must be aware of succession in a single act of awareness. This implies that each momentary episode of 
experiencing is necessary but not sufficient to the perception of the whole process, and that our 
awareness of a succession takes time to occur. In other words, then, this view maintains that temporal 
consciousness is a process. The process view needs not to deny any of the propositions in the triad, 
given that it understands the paradox of temporal consciousness as arising from what may be called a 
‘category mistake’: the incommensurability between the extension of a single act of awareness and the 
temporal properties of its object reflects the incommensurability between a stative conception of 
temporal consciousness and the processual nature of temporal properties, which can be overcome if we 
recognise that temporal experience is itself processual. 
Although this may look plausible, there are some considerations that we still need to confront to give 
more credibility to this proposal. In what follows, I will present what I believe are the most compelling 
objections to this view, and sketch a possible way in which processualism can begin to address them. 
The first difficulty is the very definition of experience as a process. In Verbs and times, Vendler (1957, 
155) notes that “seeing in "I saw him running (or crossing the street)" must have a sense that admits a 
period of time: a process or a state”. But, he adds, seeing cannot be a process. Indeed, he argues, 
processes present peculiar features that are not shared by verbs of perception such as seeing: for 
example, processes can be carried out in different ways, whereas we cannot see deliberately nor 
carefully; also, processes includes activities4, but questions of the form “what are you doing?” do not 
admit “I am seeing…” as a possible answer; moreover, the fact that being able to see, given certain 
conditions, is itself seeing, seems to suggest that, like other stative or achievement verbs, ‘see’ is 
something spontaneous rather than a deliberate action. 
A possible way to reply to this objection may be to argue that the sense of ‘seeing’ that does not admit 
of a process use (for instance, when seeing is used to mean ‘spotting’, as in Vendler’s examples), is not 
the sense in which it is used with reference to temporal properties. In this case, in fact, it seems that to 
see is not merely a spontaneous act, but something that can be done or avoided with a certain degree of 
                                                          
4 According to Vendler, processes can be distinguished into two categories: activities and accomplishments. 
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autonomy. In Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit (1912)5, Husserl notes that in our visual field the 
distinction between ‘observed’ and ‘not observed’ can be further refined to accommodate what he calls 
the ‘unobserved’. The importance of this distinction to our analysis is that it introduces the concept of 
activity within our experience: in fact, while the not observed is a mere negative of the observed, 
passively determined as a function of what does not fall in one’s visual field at one moment, the 
unobserved instead corresponds to what is actively neglected, or ignored, despite visible here and now. 
Our gaze wanders more or less deliberately within the realm of the observable – I ignore this and that, 
or linger here and there; I calculate what to expect and correct the calculations; I manage to focus on 
something, neglecting something else at the same time. Although nobody could be charged for doing 
it, we do decide (despite not always consciously) to what event we give perceptual consent, with a 
voluntariness that resembles the one of physical movement. As we saw in the first chapter, this occurs 
with the sound of a clock’s hands – it seems that we can decide whether to pay attention to it. This does 
not necessarily mean that we do not hear it anymore – given that the sound still remains perceptively 
available – but that it is only unobserved.  
Also, in “I saw a man fall from the balcony at 10.01 a.m.”, there is a sense in which the verb ‘saw’ is 
not processual: indeed, if I were asked what I was doing at 10.01 a.m., I may reply, “I was going to 
work”. This answer gives us a reason to interpret the verb ‘see’ as something that spontaneously 
happened, but a different answer could suggest a different use. In the reply: “I was watching this poor 
man!”, ‘watch’ is a process verb and it can be used to refer to activities. Indeed, although spotting a 
man falling from the balcony is a spontaneous achievement that does not require deliberate action, the 
same cannot be said when we see a man fall from the balcony, in which case it seems that one undertakes 
a certain form of deliberate act, that can be performed with different modalities (listlessly, attentively, 
carefully). According to this interpretation, then, it seems that there is a sense according to which to be 
able to see something is not yet to see, and precisely in the sense that what falls within my visual field 
may hereby be observed, but may as well be deliberately neglected. To conclude, then, if we agree that 
(say) to hear a succession could be a form of activity, then it may be plausible to argue that to hear is to 
undertake a process where the temporal properties of events, given that this process is perceptual, are 
not hereby merely inferred, deducted or remembered, but seen.  
If this is the case, then, the processualist may also be able to account for the difference between an 
experience of succession and a succession of experiences. In the light of these considerations, in effect, 
one may propose that to experience a succession is to undertake some sort of activity, whereas being 
aware that sounds are successive is not. Think again of the word ‘sentences’: when it is uttered, a 
succession of three ‘es’ may well enter our auditory experience. To be heard as a succession, though, 
our attention needs to be directed towards the sounds of the ‘es’ and exclude all other sounds; as soon 
                                                          
5 In bibliography, Percezione e Attenzione, it. tr. A. Scanziani 
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as the first one is heard, our perception (aware of the average length of words) attends the next one to 
come shortly and another after this, until something that satisfies the expectations is heard, while the 
intermediate letters keep silent. When the succession is heard, then, there is something we are doing, 
and we can do it in different ways. Our experience has a scope, it can be interrupted, it requires an effort 
and it can fail. Given the peculiarity of the concept of process, in fact, there are different ways in which 
an experience of succession can differ from a succession of experience. First, it may be that, in hearing 
a succession of sounds, we simply do not undertake such process. This case can be represented in 
opposition to the one just described: imagine that the succession of three ‘es’ enters our auditory 
experience, but that we are aware of it in a similar way in which we are aware of our auditory 
background. In this case, we are not doing anything in particular to be in this state of awareness, nor 
would it make sense to say that we can hear the succession in any particular way; rather, it seems that 
to have a pair of ears would suffice – in effect, it seems that to be able to hear the succession is by itself 
to be aware of it in this sense. But I could be merely aware that sounds are successive also when I fail 
to hear the succession: in the hour-hand case, for instance, we fail to see a succession because the second 
observed position occupied by the hand is not where we expected it to be. Also, the succession may be 
interrupted: if we are listening to a succession of sounds S1…S10, and this experience is interrupted 
between S4 to S7, despite the experiences of these two sounds is successive, they are not experienced as 
such.  
The last objection I want to address here comes from a phenomenological consideration. In fact, even 
if we clarified why experience of succession and succession of experiences may differ from each other, 
one may argue, along the line of retentionalism, that we still owe a clarification of their phenomenal 
difference. In effect, in our example of the word ‘sentences’, it seems that no reason is given how the 
sound of the first ‘e’ differs from the same sound in a mere succession of experiences.  
According to the process view, though, no such difference need be found in a single act of awareness. 
This distinction is crucial within a retentionalist’s view, given that a stative succession of experiences 
is experienced as a succession only if each element of such succession presents a system of protentions 
and retentions that binds them together, similarly to how the shape and colour of a piece of a puzzle 
rules its possible combinations. According to processualism, instead, it is the active operation of 
experience that interweaves such elements together. At any time t the phenomenal difference between 
the experience of ‘e’ in a succession of experiences and in an experience of succession is that, in the 
latter, the ‘e’ is experienced as a part of a process that is phenomenologically prior6 to any single 
experience at time t. But if this is the case, then, the phenomenal difference between a succession of 
experience and an experience of succession cannot be found at any single act of awareness considered 
in isolation. If we think again of the analogy with the act of running, the fact that there is no phenomenal 
                                                          
6 But not metaphysically, since it is accomplished one act of awareness at a time 
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difference between a single moment of the run and, say, a realistic painting that represents that very 
moment, seems not to constitute a problem, in that the difference between them is that, in the run, that 
moment is preceded and followed by a series of other acts, while this is not the case for the painting. 
Similarly, to address this worry, the processualist can argue that the phenomenology of any single phase 
of the process is a mere abstraction that depends on the phenomenology of the process to which they 




In the first section, I presented extensionalism and retentionalism as two ways of treating the paradox 
of temporal consciousness introduced at the outset, and advanced critical considerations against their 
individual solutions, noting their insufficiency in capturing what is special about the experience of time. 
In section two, I identified the individuation argument as the necessary condition shared by both theories 
to account for temporal consciousness, but found that this raise phenomenological objections. I took a 
step back in section three, and noticed that all the views encountered, although they solve the paradox 
in different ways (each of them denying a different proposition of the triad) all share a common 
interpretation of phenomeno-temporal realism. This consideration opened the space for a new proposal 
that preserves the validity of all propositions in the triad, and whose structure I began to outline in the 
section’s conclusion. Finally, I presented two of the most relevant objections that could be moved 
against this view, and I sketched a possible way they could be addressed. To conclude, then, although 
the viability of this position needs to be investigated further, I believe this work provides sufficient 
reasons in favour of the possibility of developing, along the lines of this proposal, an original position 
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